Abstract This paper studies the selection of partners for R&D collaborations of firms both empirically, by analyzing a large data set of R&D alliances over 25 years, and theoretically, by utilizing an agent-based model of alliance formation. We quantify the topological position of a firm in the R&D network by means of the weighted k-core decomposition which assigns a coreness value to each firm. The evolution of these coreness values over time reconstructs the career path of individual firms, where lower coreness indicates a better integration of firms in an evolving R&D network. Using a large patent dataset, we demonstrate that coreness values strongly correlate with the number of patents of a firm. Analyzing coreness differences between firms and their partners, we identify a change in selecting partners: less integrated firms choose partners of similar coreness until they reach their best network position. After that, well integrated firms (with low coreness) choose preferably partners with high coreness, either newcomers or firms from the periphery. We use the agent-based model to test whether this change in behavior needs to be explained by means of strategic considerations, i.e. firms switching their strategy in choosing partners dependent on their network position. We find that the observed behavior can be well reproduced without such strategic considerations, this way challenging the role of strategies in explaining macro patterns of collaborations.
Introduction
The structure and dynamics of many social and economic systems can be studied by utilizing the network approach. Here, nodes in a network represent the actors, or agents, such as firms in an economic system, while links between nodes represent their interactions, for instance the mutual exchange of knowledge. The complex network approach, in particular, builds on the fact that there is a large number of similar agents which allows to express their interactions in terms of statistical rules rather than individual decisions.
Our second data set is used to estimate the success of each firm, to later relate this to the network position. As a measure of success we use a firm's knowledge production as measured by the number of patents in the respective time window. This data is obtained from the NBER patent database of the National Bureau of Economic Research. It contains detailed information on about almost three million patents granted in the U.S.A. between 1974 and 2006. Every patent is associated with one or more assignees and is classified according to the International Patent Classification (IPC) system. In general the NBER database is of very high quality, and allowed us to cross-link the firm names involved in alliances in the SDC database with patent information.
Reconstructing the R&D network
Because the network of firm collaborations is highly dynamic, as pointed out in Sect. 1, there are various ways of studying its evolution over time. In a recent work [24] we focused on the 3/25 changing growth pattern in consecutive 5-year time intervals, to reveal a remarkable life cycle dynamics of the R&D network over the whole period of 25 years. Here, our focus is different: we want to find out how a firm's (current) position in the network impacts its (future) strategy of forming alliances with other firms.
This builds on the assumption that topological measures, i.e. quantifications of the network position, indeed capture relevant information for strategic decisions. To characterize the information encoded in a network's topology, we distinguish between local and global information. The former has its focus on the specific firm in relation to its partners: its degree characterizes the number of alliance partners, which are direct neighbors in the network at any instance of time. Hence, the cumulative degree, aggregated over time, tells us about the variety of partners in the recent history. The cumulative weight for each link, on the other hand, tells us how often the same partner was chosen over the available time period.
We argue that cumulative values tell more about a possible strategy because they also reflect the previous experience of a firm with respect to diversified and repeated interactions. Hence, in the following we will focus on the cumulative network of R&D collaborations, aggregated over time up to a given year. This implies that the cumulative network further evolves over time, as new annual data is considered. This gives it an advantage over the aggregated network which only considers one static topology. The cumulative network is also preferred over a time-sliced reconstruction of the network which often only results in a large number of disconnected components. Hence, from the cumulative network, we can deduce global information about the position of a firm beyond the relation to its nearest neighbors. For instance, we can characterize its embeddedness in larger communities, its belonging to (dis)connected components of the network, its importance in connecting other firms that are not neighbors in the network, etc.
To reconstruct the cumulative R&D network, we use as time resolution one year and add a new link to the cumulative network every time an alliance of two firms is announced in the dataset in this time window. When an alliance involved more than two firms (consortium), all the firms involved are connected in pairs, resulting into a fully connected clique. The weight w ij (t) of a link indicates the total number of alliances between firms i and j up to time t. If, during the same time interval, two firms i and j have more than one collaboration on different projects, such multiple links are also considered in the weight.
Largest connected component and cluster sizes
One prominent feature of the R&D network as shown in Figure 1 is the emergence of a large connected component, in which all firms are either directly or indirectly connected. This component is not homogeneous with respect to the economic activities of the firms as the different colors indicate. Instead, it is dominated by the two sectors, pharmaceuticals and computer software. The largest connected component is surrounded by a large number of much smaller components. These indicate isolated clusters of a few firms collaborating. The mixed colors indicate that usually firms from different economic sectors engage in R&D alliances which highlights the importance of their complementary knowledge bases.
In order to characterize the distribution of sizes of the different components, or clusters, we use an approach from percolation theory. We compare the average cluster size I av of the network including the largest connected component with the reduced average cluster size I ′ av of the network without the largest connected component. Specifically, these quantities are calculated as:
where m ≥ 2 are the sizes of the clusters (isolated firms are not considered) and h m is the number of clusters of size m and N is the total number of firms in the network at a given time.
The evolution of I av and I ′ av over the time period of 25 years is shown in Figure 2 . During early years, the network is still fragmented, i.e many isolated and general small clusters exist. But already at an early stage a larger cluster emerges, which becomes the largest connected component over time. After the years 1992-1993, it dominates the network, which means that knowledge can potentially diffuse across the whole network.
Quantifying network positions
Given that we have reconstructed the cumulative R&D network, we need to characterize the importance of nodes in this network. In a network approach, this importance is quantified by purely topological measures, i.e. deduced from the link structure of the network rather than using economic measures (such as market capitalization).
There are various centrality measures to capture the (topological) importance of nodes that are also partially correlated [8] . For example, degree centrality simply counts the number of links d i of node i and thus only captures local information about a node and its nearest neighbors.
Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, quantifies the importance of node i in connecting all other nodes in the system via the shortest path. Such a measure might be of interest in cases where the shortest path has a practical meaning, but it does not allow to capture core-periphery structures.
The main centrality measure used in this paper is called coreness C i C . It has its roots to social network analysis [4, 23] and aims to measure the importance of a node relative to others. For a given network, a coreness value can be assigned to every node based on a procedure called k-core decomposition. This procedure recursively removes all nodes with a degree less than d, i.e., it simulates a cascade that consecutively removes nodes with a degree less than d until only nodes with a degree equal or larger than d remain in the network. The procedure starts with d = 1, i.e. it removes all nodes that have only one neighbor in the networks. The removal may leave these neighboring nodes with one additional neighbor, hence in the second step of the cascade such nodes are also removed. Their removal again may leave other nodes with one remaining neighbor. Thus, in the third step they are also removed and so forth, unless the cascade stops. Then, all nodes that have been removed during this cascade are assigned a shell number k s equal to d.
Nodes with a small k s obviously have been removed very early because they were topologically not well integrated in the network. Consequently, nodes in the shell with the largest k s = k max s are counted as the the core of the network. The difference between the k i s value of a node i and the value of the core is called coreness,
It can be used to measure the importance of nodes based on the assumption that the most important nodes are part of the core and nodes in the periphery of the network, i.e. at some distance from the core, are less important.
Since the method described uses only information about the node degree and ignores the weight of links, it is called unweighted k-core decomposition. This method has been successfully applied to characterize various real-world networks [6, 9] . Kitsak et al. [15] showed that the coreness value of a node is a more accurate predictor of its spreading potential as, for example, its degree. This is understandable since coreness also captures information about the second-nearest neighbors of a node (for example, a node A with high degree can have a low coreness if all of its neighbors simply have one neighbor, A)
In this paper, we will use a recent extension of the unweighted k-core decomposition which considers additionally the weights of the links. This weighted k-core decomposition [10] uses the same routine to remove nodes as in the unweighted version, but a refined measure for the node degree, called weighted degree, d
′ . For node i it is defined as:
i is the degree of node i and w ij is the weight of the link between nodes i and j. The summation goes over all neighbors of i. All coreness values reported in this paper are based on the weighted k-core decomposition.
Eqn. (2) further uses two free parameters α, β to balance the influence of the weights w ij which indicate multiple alliances between the same firms. β = 0 would return the results of the the unweighted k-core decomposition. In this paper, we use α = 1 and β = 0.2. The choice is justified in Sect. 3.1 where we show that with β = 0.2 the correlation between network position and performance is maximized. But in Sect. 3 we will also address the question how other values of β impact the list of firms in the core.
Distribution of coreness values
In the following we apply the k-core decomposition to the cumulative R&D network, to assign coreness values to each firm. Evidently, whenever the network evolves over time most coreness values change. To define a reference point, we take the cumulative R&D network at the very , we see that the total number of firms with small coreness values, 0 ≤ C F ≤ 5, i.e. firms that are part of, or very close to, the core is rather small, but there is a large number of firms in the periphery, C F > 5. I.e. the network exhibits a very distinct core-periphery structure.
As an important observation for the real R&D network, we find that only 17 distinct k-shells exist although the maximum degree in the network is d max = 336. It is worth to notice the names of the firms that belong to the core, i.e. C F = 0, which are listed in Appendix A. There, we also discuss how this list changes if instead of the weighted k-core analysis the unweighted method is used.
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Correlations between network position and success
Before we further discuss how the network position of important firms in the R&D network changes over time, we want to explore to what extent this position is indicative of success. As explained in Sect. 2.1, we measure the success of R&D activities of firms by the number of patents obtained from the NBER database.
Let us first discuss how this number correlates with the coreness value of firms. The results are shown in Figure 4 . According to the distribution of coreness values shown in Figure 3 (right), each firm belongs to one out of 17 different classes indicated by the final coreness value C F . Hence, in Figure 4 we show the distribution of patent numbers for each of these classes, together with the average number of patents and the 95% confidence interval. Although the patent data is rather scattered, there is a very clear trend that the number of patents increases with a better network position, i.e. with smaller C F where C F = 0 indicates the core. More precisely, we calculate the Kendall pairwise correlation between the number of patents N p (z) in class z and the value of z which quantifies the network position. If z is quantified by coreness C F , as provided by the weighted k-core decomposition method, the correlation implicitly depends on the two free parameters α and β that influence this coreness value. If we take α = 1, β = 1, this correlation reads as τ = −0.493 (p < 0.001). However, the correlation could be vastly improved, as we can see if we calculate it for all pairs (α, β) This means that for β = 0.2 the weighted coreness of a firm -i.e. a topological measure -becomes a very strong indicator of its success in R&D activities, as measured by the number of patents. Hence, it establishes a link between public information (number of patents) and network position (node centrality), which is not directly accessible.
Evolution of coreness values for individual firms
Now that we have confirmed that the coreness value of a firm is a good indicator of its success in R&D activities, our focus is on the evolution of this indicator over time. This helps us to reconstruct a career path of individual firms in the R&D landscape. Subsequently, we will address the question how this career path depends on the alliance partners, to identify strategies followed by successful firms. Basically, we need to consider that the coreness value, C i C (t), of a firm i can change over time t by means of two different dynamic processes: (a) the growth of the network as a whole, as already demonstrated in Figure 1 , and (b) the formation of new alliances involving that particular firm i. Figure 5 sketches a growing network where, similar to real R&D networks, new nodes enter the network by creating new links either with existing nodes or with other newcomers. As the network grows both in size and density, new k-shells emerge and the coreness of all nodes constantly changes with the global connectivity pattern. This implies that the coreness of a particular firm i may change even without any new R&D alliances involving that firm. This contrasts with the second process, where firm i plays an active role in forming new alliances.
We argue that the two dynamic processes can be disentangled in the time evolution of the coreness values of individual firms, as shown in Figure 6 . To make coreness values comparable at different times, we define relative coreness as c In Figure 6 , we present two examples of successful firms that made it to the core of the R&D network together with two examples of "normal" firms that always belong to the network, but only at the periphery. All firms start their career path with high relative coreness values, which is due to the fact that in the beginning no fully developed network existed (cf also Figure 1) . The successful firms then show a steadily declining relative coreness reaching small values, which means that they manage to get closer to the core as the network evolves. I.e. they actively formed alliances such that they stayed away from the periphery, which distinguishes them from the "normal" firms that neither lost or gained in position and thus just stayed in the periphery. Looking at the corresponding patent data, we verify that for the successful firms a better coreness comes along with more patents (as also indicated in Figure 4) , whereas for the "normal" firms both the position and the number of patents is rather level (in comparison to the successful firms).
It is important to recognize that even successful firms do not always manage to stay in the very core (c i = 0). In most of the cases, there is a minimum c corresponding to the best overall position in the R&D network. In later times, this position can become worse, but successful firms always stay very close to the core.
Partner selection of newcomers
As already mentioned, the growth of the R&D network occurs by firms selecting partners for R&D alliances. These partners can be newcomers, i.e.
nodes not yet linked to the network at a given time t, or incumbents, i.e. firms already established in the network. This way, the network can grow in size, by adding new nodes, but also in density, by adding new links. To disentangle these dynamic processes, we first take the perspective of the newcomer that never linked to the network before.
The prevalent preferential attachment model of network growth proposes that new nodes choose partners proportional to their degree, i.e. proportional to the number of already established alliances. Such an assumption has several conceptual drawbacks when applying it plainly to the growth of real R&D networks. First, it requires newcomers to have complete information about all the alliances of all firms, to rank these accordingly. Secondly, this neglects any capacity constraints that established firms may have in accepting new alliances. And thirdly, it assumes that a newcomer is attractive enough to be accepted by an established firm as an alliance partner.
Applying the simple preferential attachment rule to growing networks results in a dissortative network where nodes with low degree are more likely linked to nodes with high degree. But the real R&D network is assortative, i.e nodes with similar degree are more likely to be linked. Specifically, we find for the assortativity coefficient r = 0.166. This is in line with positive assortativity coefficients, ranging from 0.12 to 0.363, for various collaboration networks, like scientific co-authorship networks [18] and highlights the existence of degree-degree correlations.
Hence, taking these insights into account, we can expect that newcomers do not follow a preferential attachment rule because they hardly succeed to establish alliances with those firms that are already well integrated in the R&D network. To analyze the real situation, we take again coreness as the most appropriate topological measure of this integration. Figure 7 shows the percentage of all alliances that firms with a given coreness value form with newcomers. Firms in the core only have about 12% of their alliances with newcomers. This share increases with coreness, i.e. with the distance from the core, such that firms in the periphery have almost 40% with newcomers. Taking the perspective of newcomers, this means that the vast majority of partners are firms in the outer parts of the network. Figure 7 : Histogram of the fraction f 18 i.e. the number of new entries (nodes that were previously not part of the network, assigned to k s = 18) that partner with nodes having coreness C F divided with the total number of partners of these nodes.
Partner selection of incumbents
We now look at the formation of alliances from the perspective of incumbents, i.e. firms that are already part of the network. Such a firm could form alliances with newcomers, with firms that are integrated at a level comparable to itself, or with firms that are much better integrated and may even belong to the core. The choice between such alternatives of course depend on the attractiveness of the firm itself. Again, we consider coreness as the most appropriate measure to quantify both the embeddedness in the network and the success of R&D activities, i.e. the attractiveness of a firm. That means we should be interested in the coreness value differences between firms at the time of alliance formation. Figure 8 shows, for two successful firms, their relative coreness together with the relative coreness of their alliance partners. We observe that a successful firm was able to steadily improve its coreness in the course of time. It does not always reach the very core, c = 0, but it is very close to it, indicated by the small values of c. As Figure 8 (left) shows, the network position can also worsen at later times, in particular because other firms managed to become better integrated into the core. We recall that the network position is quantified by a relative measure that takes the core-periphery structure of the whole network into account.
As discussed for newcomers, in the early period when firms are rather new to the network and thus part of the periphery, they have a strong tendency to choose alliance partners that are also part of the periphery. When these firms become better integrated in the network, as indicated by a decreasing coreness value, they choose partners of comparable coreness that are also better integrated. The decrease in coreness, both of firm i and its partners, continues until the firm reaches a state of minimal coreness, the time of which, t i c , is indicated by a red line in Figure 8 . This raises the question whether this observation can be interpreted as a change in the strategy of a firm in selecting its partners. It could also be that firms in the periphery or newcomers act differently from core firms simply because they have different options to choose from. This would then probably not count as a change in their strategy, but as a direct reflection of their network position. We will address precisely this question in Sect. 4 by means of an agent-based model that allows us to disentangle strategic behavior from restrictions of choice. But before, we verify the above finding by taking into account all alliances of all firms over time.
For each firm i, we calculate the relative coreness c i (t) for every year t and the time t i c of minimal coreness. We further calculate the number of alliances with each of their partners j, i.e. w ij (t), and the total number of alliances A i (t) = ∑ j w ij (t) in the given year. Eventually, we calculate the relative coreness c j (t) of each of their partners j. Combining all these information, we obtain the weighted average of coreness differences: 
For each firm i, these two values are related to the final coreness value of that firm, C F at t end , i.e., ⟨dc i before ⟩ (C F ) and ⟨dc i after ⟩ (C F ). Then, for each value of C F (between 0 and 17), we average the ⟨dc i ⟩ with the same C F separately before and after t c .
The results are shown in Figure 9 . We observe that, for the two periods before and after t c , the averaged coreness differences decrease monotonously with final coreness C F and even become negative. Positive values mean that the initiating firm has, on average, a higher coreness than its chosen partners. This applies for initiators with high coreness, i.e. newcomers or firms in the periphery that strive to get a better network position by choosing better integrated partners. Negative values mean that this relation switches: initiating firms have on average a lower coreness, i.e. they are better integrated than their partners. This applies for initiators with low coreness that made it to the core and confirms the previous discussion that firms closer to the core have more alliances with newcomers or firms with high coreness.
Looking particularly at differences between the two time periods, we find that this shift from positive to negative coreness differences becomes much stronger in the period after t c , i.e., for firms that have already reached their best network position. This means that established core firms choose even more partners with high coreness (newcomers, periphery) than firms in the period before t c that are still striving for a better position.
To test the robustness of this finding, we perform a random reshuffling of the alliance links while preserving the degree sequence of the empirical network. The dashed curves in Figure 9 show the averaged coreness differences before and after t c for the reshuffled network. We see that the trend is the same as for the empirical network. However, the differences between the two curves are much larger for the empirical network than for the reshuffled network. This means that the observed change before and after t c is not random. We preformed a two-sided KolmogorovSmirnov test to the distributions of the ⟨dc⟩ for the empirical and the reshuffled network, and we can reject that they are the same with p = 0.056.
As discussed above, it needs further investigation to decide whether our observation that firms change their selection criteria for partners can be interpreted as a change in strategy. In the next section, we will use an agent-based model that allows to test to what extent the observed pattern can be reproduced without stragetic considerations.
Modeling the alliance formation

Agent-based model
Now that we have identified the dynamics of firms forming R&D alliances dependent on their success, it remains to reproduce this behavior by means of an agent-based model. Such a modeling approach can be regarded as successful if it is able to reproduce the pattern in alliance formation observed in Figure 9 , which we take as a benchmark here. At the same time, a correct agentbased model should be able to additionally reproduce other empirical observations, such as the empirical degree distribution of the R&D network or the coreness distribution. Only if different dimensions of this rather complex phenomenon are reproduced by the same model, we can claim that the model captures the essence of the dynamic interactions that lead to R&D alliances, rather than simply (over)fitting free parameters to available observations.
In the following, we utilize a recently proposed agent-based model of alliance formation in R&D networks [25] . Agents represent firms in an R&D network and links between agents represent R&D collaborations. The model uses two macroscopic features of empirical R&D collaborations as input, the distribution of agents activities and the distribution of alliance sizes (see Fig 10) . But it does not make strategic assumptions about alliance formation. Instead, the decision of agents in establishing alliances with newcomers or incumbents are modeled by means of five probabilities, which need to be calibrated. Therefore, this is an ideal null model to test whether the observed change in firms strategies need strategic agent considerations as an explanation. Hereafter, we briefly sketch the outline of the model, further explanations and mathematical details are given in [25] .
Assuming a multi-agent system with N agents, each agent is assigned two fundamental attributes: an activity and a label. The activity defines the propensity of each agent to be involved in a collaboration event, and the label is a unique attribute that once set for an agent and does not change afterwards.
Initially we assign to each agent an activity value a i , which is sampled without replacement from the distribution of empirical activities shown in Fig. 10(left) . At every time step agent i initiates an alliance with probability p i ∝ a i dt. Thus, at each time step the number of active agents is N A ∝ ⟨a⟩N dt, where ⟨a⟩ is the average agent activity. Upon activation, an agent becomes an initiator, i.e. selects the number of partners, m, with whom the alliance is formed. This value of m is sampled without replacement from the empirical distribution of alliance sizes shown in Fig. 10 (right). The label attribute is used to model the participation of an agent in different groups with shared practices and/or behaviors. For the case of firms forming R&D alliances, labels translate to membership, "clubs" or "circles of influence". In our model we assume that collaborations allow the transfer of such membership to other agents that are not part of any circle of influence yet. At the beginning of a simulation, all agents are non-labeled, meaning that their membership attribute is blank. There are two ways a non-labeled agent can obtain its label: (i) the agent either receives the label from another agent, if the latter initiates an alliance, or (ii) it takes an arbitrary and unique label when it becomes active for the first time. Hence, if the agent that initiates the alliance is a non-labeled one (newcomer ), it links to a labeled agent with probability p NL l , or to another non-labeled agent with probability p NL nl . If the agent that initiates the alliance is already labeled (incumbent), it has three options to form a link. It can i) link to an agent with the same label with probability p L s , ii) link to an agent with a different label with probability p L d , or iii) link to an agent without a label with probability p L n . As the number of alliance partners, m, is already given, the above five probabilities decide how many of the m partners come from each available partner category (same/different/no label ). To actually select the partners within these categories, we use a linear preferential attachment rule, where the probability to attach to a node j linearly scales with its degree d j , i.e. Π(d j ) ∝ d j . This rule applies only for incumbents that are already assigned to a category, as by definition newcomers are non-labeled and have no previous partners (d j = 0). Therefore, if the initiator connects to a newcomer, the partner is selected among all non-labeled nodes with equal probability. When the partner selection process is complete, all m partners are mutually connected, forming a fully connected clique of size m + 1. This reflects the meaning of R&D alliances in a consortium.
Model results
In order to run agent-based computer simulations, we need to determine the five probabilities. This was done in Ref. [25] using the R&D data set described in Sect. 2. We use these results here, to simulate the evolution of 100 synthetic networks over time. Their (time dependent) topology is analyzed with respect to the weighted k-core decomposition, to allow a comparison with the empirical R&D network.
Our main result is presented in Figure 11 which should be compared to the empirical finding shown in Figure 9 . It demonstrates that the agent-based model we used is indeed able to reproduce the change of strategies in firms after they have reached the core. This is remarkable as our simulations do not use assumptions about the strategic behavior of firms.
To verify that the agent-based model is also able to reproduce other empirical findings without overfitting, we plot in Figure12(left) the degree distribution of the network ensembles obtained from the 100 realizations, alongside of the empirical degree distribution, both for the final time. The excellent match of the two distributions should be noted. We further plot in Figure12(right) the distribution of the coreness values both from the empirical data (also shown in Figure 3 (right) and from the computer simulations. Here, we use the normalized coreness C ′ instead of C F . While one could argue about some deviations between the two in the range of small coreness values, we note that the core-periphery structure of the network is well captured by the modelwithout any additional assumptions.
Discussion
In this paper we address an important question for the evolution of real networks, in particular R&D networks, namely which partners firms select for their collaborations. Our approach can be best described as data-driven modeling, i.e. we first analyze large-scale time-resolved data about R&D collaborations of firms. The aggregated outcome of this analysis is then used to calibrate an agent-based model that captures the interactions of firms in forming R&D alliances. This agent-based model is then validated by its ability to reproduce the dynamics of the R&D network at the macro level, in addition to topological features observed in the network. In this particular application, we want to reproduce the observed change of partners by successful firms, from partners with similar coreness to partners with high coreness.
Coreness and success In order to quantify the network position of individual firms, we propose a method that is rather new compared to established centrality measures, the weighted k-core decomposition. This assumes a sequence of cascades to prune the network and assigns a coreness value to each node that indicates its distance from the core.
As the network evolves both by adding new nodes and new links, individual coreness values change to reflect the relative position of nodes. We observe the emergence of a clear core-periphery structure characterized by a dense core with a smaller number of firms and a sparse periphery with the majority of less integrated firms.
Analyzing the coreness of firms and their number of patents as a proxy of their success in R&D activities, we find a strong correlation (τ = −0.84 for α = 1, β = 0.2 for the weighted k-core decomposition). That means, we can use a topological measure, coreness, that quantifies the network position as an indicator of successful R&D activities and, hence, as a measure of the attractiveness of a firm as potential collaboration partner.
Selection of partners Monitoring a firm's coreness over time allows us to determine its career path. The most successful firms move from the periphery of the R&D network (close) to the core in the course of time, i.e. from high to low coreness values. From the data, we obtain a time t i c for each firm when the minimal coreness, i.e. the best network integration, is reached. At about t i c we observe a change in partner selection, from partners of similar coreness to partners of high coreness.
Such an observed behavior may have a rational basis. Firms new to the network may have little chances to get connected to core firms. Therefore, in the absence of better alternatives, they may eventually team up with other newcomers or firms from the periphery with comparable coreness. Together with their partners, they then try to improve their network position. However, at the time of maximum network integration, the competition with other firms of similar or lower coreness can become more important than the opportunity to further increase their (already optimal) position. So, while previous partners may have become competitors, successful firms more likely search for, and to team up with, new start-up companies with fresh ideas.
Strategic behavior vs. changed opportunities The question is whether this observed change in partner selection indeed follows a strategy, i.e. a deliberative process, or whether the "strategic" behavior is still the same but the opportunities for firms have changed.
To decide between these two alternative explanations, we propose an agent-based model that assigns fixed probabilities to firms for choosing their partners, irrespective of any network position. We demonstrate that this agent-based model is able to reproduce the observed change in partner selection together with other topological features, such as degree distribution and coreness distribution. This indicates that the model indeed captures the essence of forming R&D alliances between firms.
From the results, we can conclude that the change in choosing partners can be reproduced without assuming changes in the selection rules for partners and without assuming any dependence of these rules on the network position. This does not allow to conclude that firms do not follow strategies in selecting their partners, or change these strategies dependent on the network position. It just demonstrates that firms do not need to change strategies in order to display a "behavior" that is observed in their career path.
Agent-based model This leaves us with the concluding question how we obtain from selection rules that do not depend on the network position (but on five constant probabilities) strategies in selecting partners that depend on the network position.
Our agent-based model is an activity driven model, i.e. from the empirical distribution of activities firms get assigned a (fixed) activity a i to form alliances. Obviously, in a stochastic simulation firms with a higher activity are on average chosen earlier and more often. This generates a first mover advantage because such firms can increase their degree early on. In the beginning, they also get a higher chance to propagate their label to other (unlabeled) firms.
Firms with high activity also have more alliances over time, and therefore a higher (weighed) degree in the cumulative R&D network. This becomes important when the initiator of an alliance has to select partners within the two categories "same/different label". There, we use a linear preferential attachment rule, i.e. within each category firms with a higher degree are chosen with higher probability. This further increases their degree or at least the weight of the link in case of repeated collaborations, which eventually improves their coreness value.
This preferential selection rule applies to both newcomers and incumbents. Because the network is dominated by newcomers and low-degree/high-coreness incumbent nodes, all these firms offer to establish alliances with more central firms. If this offer is accepted, the likelihood that a firm with high degree is chosen becomes even higher over time because the differentiation between firms with higher and lower degree increases. It is less pronounced in the beginning, but with an established core-periphery structure the degree distribution becomes rather skew (see also Figure  12 left).
These combined reinforcement effects eventually lead to the observation that core firms tend to form alliances preferably with newcomers. It is the newcomers that, with larger probability, choose these firms after they managed to have a low coreness/high degree (in comparison to others).
Thus, in conclusion, what appears as a deliberative strategy of successful firms, namely to switch from partners of comparable coreness to partners of high coreness, can be basically explained by the choice of newcomers. This does not exclude other strategic considerations, it just tells that the observation does not already imply such considerations.
Which of the firms eventually end up in the core of the R&D network basically depends on their individual activity, which is very skew distributed (see Figure 10 ). More active firms have an early mover advantage, they can accumulate more experience in collaborations over time, which increases their attractiveness as partners. More collaborations also lead to better integration in the network, as quantified by the decreasing coreness, and to more success in R&D activities, as quantified by the number of patents.
